In constitutional law, the focus on regulators is accountability, given their power to legislate, administer, and adjudicate. In politics, the focus is to establish and maintain public legitimacy, and they are in the political spotlight only if something goes wrong, e.g. financial crisis. This is tied to “institutional strength“, to have the greatest impact in polycentric settings. To build legitimacy, they must establish second order accountability, i.e. transparency. As such, there is a need to justify decision making. Regulators do not appear to be subject to the same rigorous oversight in judicial review as other government bodies. Regulators are subject to other factors, such as politics, economics, professionalism and expertise. As such, courts have developed avoidance mechanisms. This paper asks whether there is a constitutional justification for this avoidance. It seeks to find a constitutional framework for the regulator, and understand the judicial function in that context.