PANEL SESSIONS VI WEDNESDAY JUNE 27 2018 10.45 AM – 12.15 PM

Room: CYTT 3.20

  • NEW APPROACHES IN QUANTITATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES
    Comparative constitutional studies has been energised by the application and development of quantitative and computational methods. This panel showcases how three cutting-edge approaches cast new light on central topics within the field: the use of agent-based models to simulate the development of judicial power; the use of natural language processing methods to measure constitutional change; and the use of dynamic ideal point estimates to study judicial disagreement on non-US courts.
  • Constitutional Amendment Versus Constitutional Change: An Empirical Comparison
    The burgeoning empirical literature on constitutional drafting draws a distinction between constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement and, on the assumption that replacement is of greater magnitude and importance than amendment, treats the two as distinct phenomena. However, as an empirical matter, it is unclear whether this distinction is warranted, or whether replacements are in fact changes of greater magnitude than amendments. Using natural language processing (NLP) methods, this project empirically examines the magnitude of changes observed in both constitutional amendments and in constitutional changes (i.e. when a state introduces a new constitution). We analyse a text corpus we have constructed that enables us to compare “new” constitutions with “old” but amended constitutions. Our approach is to use the magnitude of textual change—which we can measure using NLP techniques—as a quantitative proxy for the magnitude of constitutional change.
  • ‘Studying Judicial Disagreement Quantitatively: The Case of Judges on the UK Supreme Court
    This paper reports on an ongoing study of why, how, and with what consequences judges of the UK Supreme Court (the Court) disagree. It rejects the commonly accepted starting point that judicial disagreement is ‘political’ in that it can be adequately captured along a classical liberal–conservative. Instead it argues that judicial disagreement is ‘doctrinal’. We take Harlow and Rawlings’ distinction between red- and green- light approaches as a basis for constructing a doctrinal scale of judicial ideal points. Such a dimension better captures patterns of decision-making than a classical liberal–conservative scale. This paper goes beyond our published work (“Legal Ideology, Legal Doctrine and the UK’s Top Judges”, Public Law, 2016) by presenting dynamic estimates of the ideal points of the Court’s judges. Preliminary findings suggests distinct eras of consensus and dissensus, with the Supreme Court currently witnessing a period of divergence in judicial attitudes.
  • An Agent-Based Model of Judicial Strategy
    Comparative scholarship in constitutional law and political science suggests that the power of courts to exercise judicial review depends partly on the judges’ strategic behaviour; judges can build this power only if they are mindful of how other actors are likely to react to their decisions. Arguably, compliance is the most immediate measure of judicial power.  An assertive court is not much good to anyone if its decisions are routinely ignored or defied.  Using an original agent-based model (a type of computer simulation) this paper explores the performance of several stylized judicial strategies in an environment where there are multiple compliers/non-compliers and compliance/noncompliance is a function of, among other things, prior acts of compliance/noncompliance. This simulation is intended to have some relevance for newly established constitutional courts, as well as supranational courts (eg the European Court of Human Rights) where judicial power cannot be taken for granted.