Comparative constitutional studies has been energised by the application and development of quantitative and computational methods. This panel showcases how three cutting-edge approaches cast new light on central topics within the field: the use of agent-based models to simulate the development of judicial power; the use of natural language processing methods to measure constitutional change;...
An Agent-Based Model of Judicial Strategy
Comparative scholarship in constitutional law and political science suggests that the power of courts to exercise judicial review depends partly on the judges’ strategic behaviour; judges can build this power only if they are mindful of how other actors are likely to react to their decisions. Arguably, compliance is the most immediate measure of judicial power. An assertive court is not much good to anyone...
Constitutional Amendment Versus Constitutional Change: An Empirical Comparison
The burgeoning empirical literature on constitutional drafting draws a distinction between constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement and, on the assumption that replacement is of greater magnitude and importance than amendment, treats the two as distinct phenomena. However, as an empirical matter, it is unclear whether this distinction is warranted, or whether replacements are in fact...
‘Studying Judicial Disagreement Quantitatively: The Case of Judges on the UK Supreme Court
This paper reports on an ongoing study of why, how, and with what consequences judges of the UK Supreme Court (the Court) disagree. It rejects the commonly accepted starting point that judicial disagreement is ‘political’ in that it can be adequately captured along a classical liberal–conservative. Instead it argues that judicial disagreement is ‘doctrinal’. We...