Whilst judicial review is incompatible with authoritarian ideology, the introduction of such mechanism is key to democratic constitutions. A main challenge faced in this regard is whether to adopt a centralised review, exercised by a specialized institution, or a dispersed one, entrusting ordinary courts with this power. A related issue concerns the design of individual...
Inaccessible Rights: The Unrealised Potential of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court
The current Bulgarian Constitution, adopted after the fall of communism, introduced a Constitutional Court entitled to centralised judicial review. This unprecedented institution was declared guardian of the fundamental rights entrenched in the new constitution. However, individual citizens were not granted direct access to this court. Moreover, its review powers were subjected to considerable procedural and...
Individuals in the Constitutional Court: Complaint, Protest, Scandal, and Weapons of the Weak
This paper comparatively examines the means for resistance of individuals against the constitutional judiciary. Starting with the case of the Slovak Constitutional Court, the paper critically assesses the different ways in which the Court relates to and interacts with an individual, including a change from a constitutional petition to complaint (coordinate) mechanism by an amendment...
Politics behind the vail of law: how fundamental rights discourse can hide excesses in judicial review. An empirical study from Brazil.
In the aftermath of the military dictatorship, the constituents for the Brazilian Constitution had the mission of compensating its citizens for the excesses of power endured. Thus, the current charter promises to uphold every fundamental right, from health to recreation. And guarantees it giving individuals ample access to courts via judicial review. Brazil has adopted...