This paper investigates empirically how Chinese courts adjudicate eminent domain decisions for the first time and proves that even the non-independent Chinese courts can curb local governments‘ eminent domain power to some extent. We hand-coded 586 eminent domain judgements awarded by the High People‘s Courts of China from 2014-2015, which were made available by the...
Tag: <span>Shitong Qiao</span>
Federalism and the Rights Revolution: Why Do Chinese Local Governments both Endanger and Expand Individual Land Rights?
Local governments in China are resisting and distorting the rights revolution in national law, at the core of which lies the imposition of constraints on those governments‘ eminent domain power. Meanwhile, facing national legislative gridlock, local governments experiment with such initiatives as granting farmers land development rights. Why are Chinese local governments simultaneously endangering the...
Infrastructure Institutions: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Corporation
This paper investigates three models for subway building: New York City, Shanghai City, and Hong Kong. It argues that the NYC subway suffers from too much democracy, allowing for contestation between the NY city and state governments, different interest groups, and other stakeholders. In the Shanghai model, the city government centralizes power and resources and...